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LOGIC OF LOCAL INFERENCE FOR
CONTEXTUALITY IN QUANTUM PHYSICS AND BEYOND
KOHEI KISHIDA
University of Oxford
Abstract. Contextuality in quantum physics provides a key resource for quantum information and
computation. The topological approach in [3, 2] characterizes contextuality as “global inconsistency”
coupled with “local consistency”, revealing it to be a phenomenon also found in many other fields. This
has yielded a logical method of detecting and proving the “global inconsistency” part of contextuality.
Our goal is to capture the other, “local consistency” part, which requires a novel approach to logic that
is sensitive to the topology of contexts. To achieve this, we formulate a logic of local inference by using
context-sensitive theories and models in regular categories. This provides a uniform framework for
local consistency, and lays a foundation for high-level methods of detecting, proving, and moreover
using contextuality as computational resource.
1. Introduction
Quantum physics provides quantum computing with immense advantage over classical com-
puting. Among its non-classical properties, non-locality is known to be a basis for quantum
communication (see [19]). It is in fact a special case of a more general property called contextuality,
which recent studies [22, 10] suggest is an essential source of the computational power of quantum
computers. This motivates the search for structural, higher-level expressions of contextuality that
are independent of the formalism of quantum mechanics.
One conception of contextuality that originated in [11] exploits the structure of presheaf : As
was shown in [11], a certain type of contextuality of a quantum system amounts to the absence
of global sections from presheaves modelling the behaviors of the system. The recent, “sheaf-
theoretic” approach [3] expands this insight by viewing contextuality in more general terms, as
a matter of topology in data of measurements and outcomes: A wider range of contextuality is
then characterized as the “global inconsistency” of the “locally consistent”. This has on the one
hand shown that contextual phenomena can be found in various other fields such as relational
database theory (see [1]), and on the other hand made it possible to apply various tools—sheaf
theory, cohomology, linear algebra, for instance—to contextuality. One idea that has emerged is to
formulate contextuality argument in logical terms [2]: One describes a presheaf model using logical
formulas, and proves its contextuality by deriving contradiction from the formulas.
This method, however, only shows the global inconsistency of a given set of formulas; we know
them to be locally consistent only because they describe a locally consistent model that is given.
Nonetheless, when designing ways of exploiting contextuality, we may well first obtain a set of
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formulas or a specification, and then check if there is a model satisfying it. This requires a logic
in which consistency means local consistency. The chief goal of this paper is to deliver such a
new logic of local inference. The two logics—one for global inconsistency and the other for local
consistency—together lay a foundation for high-level logical methods of not only showing but also
using contextuality as resource.
Section 2 reviews the sheaf approach to contextuality, which takes presheaves valued in Sets.
Then Section 3 defineswhat we call “inchworm logic”, a novel logic of local inference for contextual
models. We formulate this on the basis of regular logic, since its vocabulary captures the essence of
local inference. Semantics is provided for this logic in Section 4, where we generalize Sets-valued
presheaf models to ones valued in any regular category S. This encompasses cases that prove
useful and powerful in applications: E.g., presheaves of abelian groups, R-modules, etc. serve the
purpose of cohomology; indeed, Cˇech cohomology is used to detect the contextuality of Sets-valued
presheaves [2]. This paper gives a uniform way of using S-valued presheaves directly as models of
contextual logic.
2. ContextualModels
We first review the idea behind the formalism of [2], stressing that it applies to more settings
than just quantum ones. The idea captures contextuality as a matter of topological nature, which
we illustrate with a simplicial formulation equivalent to the presheaf formulation of [2]. We also
present a modification of the latter that can readily be generalized in Section 4.
2.1. Topological Models for Contextuality. The formalism of [3] concerns variables and values in
general. Their bare-bones structure consists of a set X of variables and, for each x ∈ X, a set Ax of
possible values of x. So we have an X-indexed family of sets Ax. This can model various settings in
which we make queries against a system and it answers, as observed in [1, 2]; e.g.,
• We measure properties x ∈ X of a physical system and it gives back outcomes a ∈ Ax.
• A relational database has attributes x ∈ X, and a ∈ Ax are possible data values for x.
• x ∈ X are sentences of propositional logic and a set of models assign to them boolean values
a ∈ Ax = 2. Or x ∈ X may simply be boolean variables.
We often make a query regarding several variables in combination; a set U ⊆ X of variables the
query concerns forms a context in which the system gives back a result. Contexts play essential
roˆles in the following two kinds of constraints, (a) on answers and (b) on queries.
(a) When we make a query in a context U, the system returns (one or a set of) tuples s ∈
∏
x∈U Ax
of values. It then has the subset AU ⊆
∏
x∈U Ax of “admissible” tuples that can be part of query
results, and it is often the information on AU that we want. E.g.,
• From a relational databasewe retrieve data with an attribute listU, and the database returns
the relation AU on sets Ax (x ∈ U) as a table.
• Given a set of models and a set U of sentences, AU is the set of combinations of values that
U can take; e.g., a pair ϕ,¬ϕ ∈ U only take values (1, 0) or (0, 1).
• We may measure a physical system in various states and find that some set U of quantities
always satisfies a certain equation that characterizes AU.
(A tuple s ∈
∏
x∈U Ax is a dependent function, so it is formally a set of the form { (x, s(x)) | x ∈ U and
s(x) ∈ Ax }; but we may refer to it as “(s(x), s(y), . . . ) over (x, y, . . . )”.)
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(b) We have the family C ⊆ PX of contexts in which queries can be made and answered. Wemay
not be able to make a query in a context V ⊆ X (i.e. V < C) for reasons such as:
• V may have too many variables to deal with feasibly.
• A database schema may have no table encompassing all the attributes in V.
• Quantum mechanics may deem it impossible to measure all the properties in V at once.
In these examples, if queries can be made in a context U, they can be in any V ⊆ U; we also
assume that queries can be made in {x} for any x ∈ X, but only in finite U. So C is an (abstract)
simplicial complex on X, i.e. a ⊆-downward closed subfamily of PfinX with
⋃
U∈CU = X. Also, if a
tuple s of values is admissible, so is any t ⊆ s. Hence, whenever V ⊆ U ∈ C, the projection of tuples
−|V :
∏
x∈U
Ax →
∏
x∈V
Ax :: s 7→ s|V
restricts to AV⊆U : AU → AV. Thus A : C
op → Sets forms a presheaf on the poset C.
In fact, A is a separated presheaf. Generally, for any subfamily C of PX closed under binary
intersection, whenever
⋃
iUi = U ∈ C for Ui ∈ C, a presheaf P on C has the map
〈PUi⊆U〉i : PU →
∏
i
PUi :: s 7→ (s|Ui )i
land in the set of matching families for (Ui)i,
Match(Ui)i ,P = { (ti)i ∈
∏
i
PUi | t j|U j∩Uk = tk|U j∩Uk for every pair j, k }.
Then P is called separated if each of these 〈PUi⊆U〉i is injective, and a sheaf if each of those 〈PUi⊆U〉i :
PU → Match(Ui)i ,P is bijective (see [17]). Yet, on a simplicial complex C, separated presheaves and
sheaves have simpler descriptions:
Fact 1. A presheaf P on a simplicial complex C is a sheaf iff PU =
∏
x∈U Px for all U ∈ C. And P is
separated iff it is a subpresheaf of a sheaf, i.e. iff PU ⊆
∏
x∈U Px for all U ∈ C.
This shows that our A above is a separated presheaf, but not generally a sheaf. So let us write
sPsh(C) for the full subcategory of SetsC
op
of separated presheaves. Note that every sheaf F has
F∅ = 1, a singleton. A separated presheaf P has P∅ = 1, too, unless it is the empty presheaf U 7→ ∅,
i.e. the model is inconsistent in every context (hence modelling, e.g., a physical system that never
produces outcomes in any context of measurements).
2.2. Presheaves and Bundles. The constraints (a) and (b) above are, indeed, matters of topology;
this idea will be useful in Subsection 2.3. Given a separated presheaf A as in Subsection 2.1, its
underlying family of X-indexed sets (Ax)x∈X is equivalent to a set over X, viz. π :
∑
x∈X Ax → X ::
(x, a) 7→ x, by SetsX ≃ Sets/X. The base X comes with a simplicial complex C, but so does
∑
x∈X Ax,
taking tuples s ∈ AU as simplices, i.e. A =
⋃
U∈C AU. And π is a simplicial map, or a bundle of
simplicial complexes, since s ∈ AU ⊆ A implies π[s] = U ∈ C. On the other hand, any given bundle
π :A→ C has a family of AU = { s ∈ A | π[s] = U } and AV⊆U : s 7→ s|V.
A simplicial mapπ :A→ C is called non-degenerate if π|s is injective for every s ∈ A. Ourπ above
is non-degenerate, because every s ∈ AU is a local section of the bundle π, meaning s : U →
∑
x∈X Ax
such that π ◦ s = 1U. Let us write Simp and ndSimp for the categories of simplicial maps and of
non-degenerate ones, respectively. It is easy to check that for every simplicial complex C, the slice
categoryndSimp/C is a full subcategory ofSimp/C; i.e., it is the category of non-degenerate bundles
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Figure 1. Bundles for (c) the Hardy model and (d) the PR-box
and simplicial maps over C. Then, extending SetsX ≃ Sets/X, the correspondence described above
gives
Fact 2. sPsh(C) ≃ ndSimp/C for any simplicial complex C.
So here is a topological reading of (a) and (b). Each U ∈ C is a local, small enough region of
the space X of variables. The topology on the space A of values then distinguishes those tuples
s ∈
∏
x∈U Ax in AU from the others and deems the former to be continuous sections. We refer to
objects of sPsh(C) and ndSimp/C interchangeably as topological models.
2.3. Contextuality in Physics, Databases, and More. Since queries can only be made locally, i.e.
in contexts U ∈ C, answers to queries can only be observed locally in those contexts. One might
think this is just a matter of convenience or efficiency, since we can simply makemultiple queries in
multiple contextsUi to cover X =
⋃
iUi and to recover the global information. In certain topologies
C, however, this may be prevented due to contextuality.
Given a non-degenerate bundle π : A → C over a simplicial complex C on X, consider a global
section of it, i.e. 1 ∈
∏
x∈X Ax such that 1|U ∈ AU for all U ∈ C; it corresponds to a matching family
1 ∈MatchC,P, sinceU 7→
∏
x∈U Ax (U ⊆ X) is a sheaf. It is an assignment of values to all the variables
that satisfies every constraint on combinations of values. E.g., in classical logic, the models are
exactly the global sections; so the consistency of a sentence x means that (x, 1) is part of a global
section. Then, in the physical setting, it may seem natural to similarly think of global sections 1 as
states of the system, assigning values to all the quantities—so, although we can only make a query
locally in a contextU ∈ C, the system in a state 1 actually has a value 1(x) assigned to every quantity
x, and the answer we receive in the context U is simply 1|U. This assumption, that any section we
observe is part of a context-independent global section, holds not just in classical logic but also in
classical physics—but breaks down in quantum physics, precisely when contextuality arises.
Figure 1 shows “Bell-type” scenarios in which Alice and Bob measure properties of a system,
perhaps a quantum one. The base C expresses constraints of type (b) above: Alice canmake at most
one of two measurements a1 and a2 at a time, so she chooses one; similarly Bob chooses from b1
and b2—so there are four possible combinations of measurements, indicated by the four edges of C.
Alice and Bob repeat measurements in different contexts, and learn that each x ∈ X = {a1, a2, b1, b2}
has two possible outcomes 0 and 1, but that some combinations of outcomes are never obtained. A
expresses these constraints, of type (a), with edges indicating possible combinations. E.g.,A of (c)
deems every joint outcome of (a1, b1) possible, with A{a1,b1} = 2 × 2; but (0, 0) is not a possible joint
outcome of (a2, b2).
The models in Figure 1 all violate the classical assumption above, and are examples of
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Definition 3. A topological model is said to be logically contextual if not all of its local sections extend
to global ones, and strongly contextual if it has no global section at all (see [2]).
(c) of Figure 1 represents an example of logical contextuality due to [9] that is realizable in
quantum physics. It has several global sections, e.g. the one marked in green; call it 1. So, when
Alice and Bobmeasure (a1, b1) and observe (0, 0), the classical explanation is possible that the system
was in the state 1 and had outcomes 1(x) assigned to all the measurements x ∈ X, and that Alice
and Bob have simply retrieved that information on U. On the other hand, the local section in red,
(1, 1) over (a1, b1), does not extend to any global section. This means that the classical explanation is
simply impossible for this joint outcome. Furthermore, the classical explanation is never possible
in the strongly contextual (d). This model, called the PR box [21], is not quantum-realizable (though
it plays an important roˆle in the quantum information literature), but quantum physics exhibits
many other instances of strong contextuality.
The upshot is that contextuality consists in global inconsistency coupled with local consistency: A
section s ∈ AU is consistent locally, in the sense of satisfying the constraint on query results in the
context U, but it may be inconsistent globally, in the sense of contradicting all the other constraints
and thereby failing to extend to a global section.
The general definition of contextuality in terms of global sections can also be applied to relational
databases: Contextuality then corresponds exactly to the absence of a universal relation [1]. In fact,
the natural join
⊲⊳
U∈C
AU = { 1 ∈
∏
x∈X
Ax | 1|U ∈ AU for all U ∈ C }
of relations AU (which is the largest of universal relations if there are any) is, simply by definition,
the set of global sections. Hence, e.g. in Figure 1, the sections in red are lost from ⊲⊳U∈C AU.
2.4. No-Signalling Principle. Local consistency means, partly, that a local section may exist with-
out extending to global. Yet it involves more—viz. a constraint that is called the no-signalling
principle in the physical setting [7]. For a topological model A, it amounts to the condition that
everyAU⊆V : AV → AU :: s 7→ s|U (i.e. the projection of admitted tuples, or the restriction of sections)
is a surjection.
An example violating no-signalling is (e) of Figure 1: A{b1}⊆{a2 ,b1} : A{a2,b1} → A{b1} is not surjective.
Suppose Alice and Bob make measurements, Bob chooses to measure b1, and he observes 1, which
is not in the image of A{b1}⊆{a2,b1}. This means that Bob has received the signal from Alice (no matter
how far away she may be!) that she has chosen a1 and not a2.
To see why no-signalling should be part of local consistency, regard A in (e) as representing a
relational database. It has tables A{a1,b1} and A{a2,b1}; but, when queried about the attribute b1, they
yield different results of projection, differing in whether 1 is in or not. Thus, no-signalling means
the consistency of projections (see [1]). Indeed, aswewill see in Subsection 4.3, no-signalling means
a sort of coherence of A as a semantic model of logic.
Definition 4. We say that a separated presheaf A : Cop → Sets is no-signalling if it satisfies (1), and
that a non-degenerate bundle π : A→ C is no-signalling if it satisfies (2):
(1) Every AU⊆V : AV → AU is a surjection.
(2) If π[s] ⊆ U for s ∈ A and U ∈ C, then there is some t ∈ A such that s ⊆ t and π[t] = U.
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Clearly, (1) and (2) coincide via sPsh(C) ≃ ndSimp/C (Fact 2). Hence their full subcategories of
no-signalling models are equivalent. Note that (1) or (2) implies AU , ∅ for all U ∈ C, if A∅ , ∅.
So, while the empty model is no-signalling, all the other, nonempty no-signalling models (which
are, essentially, the “empirical models” of [2]) are locally consistent.
3. Contextual Logics
After reviewing a kind of contextuality argument for topological models, we explain why the
logic of such argument is not supposed to be sound with respect to those models, and why we need
another logic, viz. the logic of topological models. We then introduce our candidate for such a logic.
3.1. Contextuality Argument: Logic of Global Inconsistency. Viewing AU as representing a con-
straint on assignments of values to variables x ∈ U, we can describe a topological model A using
formulas in contexts U ∈ C of variables. E.g., the assignments of (0, 0) and (1, 1) to (x, y) satisfy the
equation x ⊕ y = 0, where ⊕ is for XOR, i.e. addition modulo 2; the assignments (0, 1) and (1, 0)
satisfy x ⊕ y = 1. Therefore the PR box, (d) of Figure 1, satisfies the following set of equations:
a1 ⊕ b1 = 0, a1 ⊕ b2 = 0, a2 ⊕ b1 = 0, a2 ⊕ b2 = 1(3)
These are in fact inconsistent: Their right-hand sides sum to 1, but the left to 0 regardless of the
values of variables (since each variable occurs twice). This is to say that no global assignment of
values satisfies all the constraints of AU, i.e., that A is strongly contextual.
A family of arguments of this sort, using XOR (or parity) equations, has been given to show the
strong contextuality of a range of quantum examples; the first instance in literature was in [18] for
the GHZ state [8]. This sort of so-called “all-vs-nothing argument” was formalized and generalized
in [2]. On the other hand, onemay also adoptmore expressive languages, such as Boolean formulas,
to express a wider range of constraints.
Formulas can also be used to show logical (and not strong) contextuality. E.g., the Hardymodel,
(c) of Figure 1, satisfies the antecedents of
¬a1 ∨ ¬b2, ¬a2 ∨ ¬b1, a2 ∨ b2 ⊢ ¬a1 ∨ ¬b1(4)
but not the consequent, due to the contextual section (1, 1) over (a1, b1). This shows that this local
section can be part of no global assignment satisfying all the constraints.
Yet this kind of contextuality argument needs some reflection. The inconsistency of a set Γ of
formulas, Γ ⊢ ⊥, does not mean that Γ has no model; in fact, the PR box, (d) of Figure 1, satisfies
all the equations in (3). In the same vein, the derivability Γ ⊢ ϕ does not mean that every model
of Γ satisfies ϕ; the Hardy model (c) satisfies Γ but not ϕ of (4). So the logic of ⊢ here is not sound
with respect to contextual models—indeed, that is the whole point of the argument. Invalidating ⊢
precisely means contextuality: Γ ⊢ ⊥ really means that no global section satisfies Γ; it is why any
model of Γ has no global section. Γ ⊢ ϕmeans that every global section satisfying Γ satisfies ϕ; it is
why any model satisfying Γ but not ϕ must have local sections (viz. ones not satisfying ϕ) that fail
to extend to global sections.
In this sense, the logic of ⊢ here is a “global logic” of global sections. We should then note that
this logic, by itself, says very little about local consistency. To see this, consider:
a1 ⊕ b1 = 0, a1 ⊕ b1 = 1(5)
6
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Figure 2. Charlie and an inchworm
This set of equations is, like (3), inconsistent. It is, however, inconsistent not just globally but also
locally: Not only does no global section satisfy both equations, no local section over the context
{a1, b1} does; a model A satisfies (5) only if A{a1,b1} = ∅ (the physical system can give no outcomes to
the measurements a1, b1; the sentences a1, b1 are not just inconsistent but can have no truth values).
Yet the global logic does not tell us why (3) is locally consistent whereas (5) is not. Thus the kind of
argument above is really a “global-inconsistency argument”: It shows contextuality only because
we already know the formulas to be locally consistent, having obtained them as descriptions of
some model.
3.2. “InchwormLogic” of Local Inference. In contrast to (3), Γ ⊢ ⊥ of (5) means local inconsistency
over {a1, b1} since both equations in Γ are in the context {a1, b1}. Turning Γ, ϕ ⊢ ⊥ into the form of
inference, if Γ, ϕ are in a contextU, then Γ ⊢ ¬ϕ gives local entailment overU. E.g., the antecedents
of
a1 = 0, b1 = 0 ⊢ a1 ⊕ b1 = 0
rule out all the sections over (a1, b1) except (0, 0), which satisfies the consequent.
Indeed, local inference can be carried out across different contexts, validly in no-signalling
models, subject to one constraint. To see this, expand the base C in Figure 1 from (f) of Figure 2 to
(g), where the four triangles are in C—so a new experimenter, Charlie, can make his measurement
c along with Alice and Bob. Now rewrite the locally consistent (3) in the inference form (6) (we
replace x ⊕ y = 0 with simpler x = y) and compare it to (7):
a1 = b1, a1 = b2, a2 = b1 ⊢ a2 = b2(6)
a1 = b1, a1 = c, a2 = b1 ⊢ a2 = c(7)
(7) is valid in no-signalling models, whereas (6) is not (the PR box is a countermodel, as it is a model
for (3)). The only difference is c replacing b2—this tiny difference, however, enables us to obtain (7)
in the following two steps:
a1 = b1 a1 = c
U
b1 = c a2 = b1
Va2 = c
(8)
The first step is within the contextU = {a1, b1, c}, hence valid locally: Every section overU satisfying
the antecedents satisfies the consequent. Similarly, the second step is valid within V = {a2, b1, c}.
The key aspect is that the formula in the middle, b1 = c, can be in the contextU∩V and so inU or in
V. The upshot is that information gets passed on from a larger contextU to a smallerU∩V and then
to another larger V—just like the locomotion of an inchworm, if (h) of Figure 2 helps to visualize it.
Crucially, the no-signalling property is essential when the inchworm moves from a larger context
to a smaller: E.g., the first step of (8) concludes that every section over {a1, b1, c} satisfies b1 = c; but
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then, in the absence of no-signalling, there may be a section over {b1, c} violating b1 = c without
extending to {a1, b1, c}. We will discuss the semantic roˆle of no-signalling further in Subsection 4.3.
3.3. Formalizing the Inchworm. We formalize and generalize the idea of “inchworm inference”.
As in the example in Subsection 3.2, an inchworm logic is obtained by constraining a global logic.
We assume this logic to be (at least) regular, i.e. to have ⊤, ∧, and ∃, for the reasons explained
shortly.
Definition 5. Let L be a language of regular logic (or richer) whose variables include X. For each
x ∈ X, write Tx for the type of x, and then, for each x¯ ⊆ X, write Φx¯ for the set of formulas in the
context x¯ : Tx¯. Given a simplicial complexC onX, theC-contextual fragment ofL isΦC =
⋃
U∈CΦU. By
a C-contextual languageLC, we simply mean a pair of such L andΦC. Now let T be a regular theory
in L given by an entailment relation ⊢ (which is not required to be binary). Then the inchworm
fragment of ⊢ in LC is the entailment relation ⊢C on ΦC defined inductively by the following. We
write ΓU = Γ ∩ ΦU.
(9) Γ ⊢C ϕ if there is U ∈ C such that ϕ ∈ ΦU and ΓU ⊢ ϕ.
(10) If Γ ⊢C ϕ and ∆, ϕ ⊢C ψ then Γ,∆ ⊢C ψ.
(9) expresses the idea that ⊢ within a single context is valid locally as well. In (10), note that the
first two instances of ⊢C may be witnessed by different contexts. Observe also that Γ ⊢C ϕ entails
Γ ⊢ ϕ; thus ⊢C is a fragment of ⊢.
Example 6. Let L have T as a basic type; 0, 1 be constants of type T; and ⊕ be a function symbol of
type ⊕ : T × T → T. Let Tx = T for all x ∈ X. So, e.g., x : T, y : T | x ⊕ y = 1 makes sense, and is in
Φ{x,y}. This gives equations of the kind relevant to the examples in Subsection 3.1. Note that ΦC is a
union. E.g., for (f) of Figure 2, ai = 0 is in Φ{ai} ⊆ ΦC for both i = 1, 2, but a1 = 0 ∧ a2 = 0 is not in ΦC
since {a1, a2} < C.
We assume L to have ⊤ and ∧, so that pieces of information can be combined within the same
context. The inchworm moves from a smaller context U to a larger V via the order embedding
i : (ΦU,⊢U) ֒→ (ΦV,⊢V), and from V to U via the left adjoint ∃V\U of i.
ΦV ΦU
∃V\U
i
⊣
Then ∃V\U ⊣ i means that, for any ϕ ∈ ΦV, ∃V\U. ϕ ∈ ΦU encapsulates all and only the information
that ϕ entails on U. We also have ∃V\U ◦ i  1, so a piece of information that can be both about U
and about V undergoes no change when carried across U and V.
4. Contextual Semantics in Regular Categories
Our definition of model using a sheaf generalizes by replacing Sets with any category S with
finite limits, since the base C is a simplicial complex. Yet, for the sake of no-signalling, we moreover
need S to be regular. References on regular categories and their categorical logic include [20, 5, 12].
We then lay out how to model the inchworm logic in S.
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4.1. Topological Models in Regular Categories. Let C be a simplicial complex on a set X, and S
be a category with finite limits. By a presheaf on C valued in S, we mean any contravariant functor
P : Cop → S. Then the definitions of separated presheaf and sheaf generalize straightforwardly to
Definition 7. We say that an S-valued presheaf P on C is separated if the arrow
〈PUi⊆U〉i : PU →
∏
i
PUi
is monic whenever
⋃
iUi = U, and a sheaf if, whenever
⋃
iUi = U, 〈PUi⊆U〉i is an equalizer as
follows, where p j :
∏
i PUi → PU j and pk :
∏
i PUi → PUk are the projections.
PU
∏
i PUi
∏
j,k PU j∩Uk
〈PUi⊆U〉i
〈PU j∩Uk⊆U j ◦ p j〉 j,k
〈PU j∩Uk⊆Uk ◦ pk〉 j,k
Again, every sheaf F has F∅ = 1, the terminal object of S, and every separated presheaf P has
P∅֌ 1. Also, for simpler descriptions, Fact 1 generalizes to
Fact 8. An S-valued presheaf P on a simplicial complex C is a sheaf iff PU =
∏
x∈U Px for all U ∈ C.
And P is separated iff it is a subpresheaf of a sheaf, i.e. iff each 〈P{x}⊆U〉x∈U : PU →
∏
x∈U Px is monic,
i.e. iff each PU is a relation in S on (Px)x∈U.
Next we define the no-signalling property for S-valued separated presheaves. In doing so, we
need to choose from several generalizations of the notion of surjection in (1) of Definition 4; the one
that serves our purpose is the one that provides semantics for ∃ : ΦV ⇄ ΦU : i in the inchworm
logic. This is the principal reason we need S to be regular; then, in S, every arrow f : C → D gives
rise to the adjoint pair
SubS(C) SubS(D)
∃ f
f−1
⊣
(e.g. [5, Lemma 2.5]), and moreover ∃ f ◦ f
−1 = 1Sub(D) (and so f
−1 is an order embedding) if f is a
regular epi (essentially, [12, Corollary D1.2.8]). Therefore the right generalization of Definition 4 is
the following Definition 9, with an alternative description in Fact 10.
Definition 9. A separated presheaf A on a simplicial complex C valued in a regular category S is
said to be no-signalling if every AU⊆V : AV → AU is a regular epi.
Fact 10. Let F be a sheaf on a simplicial complex C. Then a family (iU : AU ֌ FU)U∈C of subobjects
forms a subpresheaf of F, and hence a separated presheaf, iff AV 6 FU⊆V
−1(AU), or equivalently
∃FU⊆V (AV) 6 AU, whenever U ⊆ V ∈ C. Moreover, a separated presheaf i : A֌ F is no-signalling iff
∃FU⊆V (AV) = AU whenever U ⊆ V ∈ C.
4.2. Global Inconsistency in Regular Categories. Definition 3 of contextuality for Sets-valued
presheaves can now extend to ones valued in any regular category S. Let A be an S-valued
separated presheaf on a simplicial complex C on X. It is a subpresheaf of a sheaf F on C. In fact,
let us assume, just in this subsection, that X is finite (or that S is complete); then, by Fact 8 (or a
straightforward generalization), F extends uniquely to a sheaf on PX, viz. F : U 7→
∏
x∈U Fx. Then
the set of global sections of A—i.e. the natural join
⊲⊳
U∈C
AU = { 1 ∈
∏
x∈X
Ax | 1|U ∈ AU for all U ∈ C }
of the relations AU ⊆ FU—generalizes to the S-valued case:
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Fact 11. Given any S-valued separated presheaf A, let F be a sheaf such that i : A֌ F and, using
AU as predicates in the internal language of S, define
⊲⊳A = J x¯ : FX |
∧
U∈C
AU(FU⊆Xx¯) K =
∧
U∈C
FU⊆X
−1(AU)֌ FX.
Then ⊲⊳A is the limit of A as a diagram in S.
For eachU ∈ C, write ρU : ⊲⊳A→ AU for the restriction of FU⊆X to ⊲⊳A; it generalizes the restriction
of global sections to local sections over U. Definition 3 then extends to
Definition 12. An S-valued separated presheaf A is said to be logically contextual if not every
ρU : ⊲⊳A → AU is a regular epi. A is moreover said to be strongly contextual if ⊲⊳A is not well-
supported, i.e. if the unique arrow !⊲⊳A : ⊲⊳A→ 1 is not a regular epi.
Rewriting this in the internal language of S, the strong contextuality of A means that S fails
∃x¯ : FX. ⊲⊳A(x¯), i.e., that no global section x¯ satisfies all the constraints AU. The logical contextuality
means that
x¯ : FV | AV(x¯) ⊢ ∃y¯ : FX\V. ⊲⊳A(〈x¯, y¯〉)
fails in S for some V ∈ C, i.e., that not every local section x¯ over V satisfying AV extends to a global
section 〈x¯, y¯〉 satisfying all AU. (We should stress that the definition makes sense for any separated
presheaves A and not just no-signalling ones.)
4.3. Contextual Interpretation. In Definition 5 we defined a contextual language LC and logic ⊢C
simply as a global language L and logic ⊢ paired with their contextual fragments. Our definition
of an interpretation of them in regular categories goes in parallel.
Definition 13. Givena contextual languageLC = (L,ΦC), an interpretationof it in a regular category
S is simply an interpretation J−K of L in S. The images of Tx and ΦU then play special roˆles: For
each x¯ ∈ C, we have
• JTx¯K =
∏
x∈x¯JTxK; therefore JT−K : C
op → S forms a sheaf by Fact 8.
• Moreover, J x¯ : Tx¯ | ϕ K֌ JTx¯K for each ϕ ∈ Φx¯.
So we may write (J−K, F) for the interpretation J−K, where F is the sheaf F : x¯ 7→ JTx¯K. We may also
write JϕKx¯ ֌ Fx¯ for J x¯ : Tx¯ | ϕ K.
Example 14. Expanding Example 6, take J−K in Setswith JTK = 2 and the obvious J0K, J1K, and J⊕K.
Then we have a sheaf JT−K : U 7→ 2
U and, e.g.,
J x : T, y : T | x ⊕ y = 0 K JT{x,y}K = 2 × 2 21
J⊕K
! J0K
is an equalizer of J⊕K and J0K ◦ !.
An interpretation J−K of L is said to model a sequent Γ ⊢ ϕ if some finite ∆ ⊆ Γ has
∧
ψ∈∆JψKU 6
JϕKU. This makes sense whether U ∈ C or not. Nevertheless, if U < C, then
∧
ψ∈∆JψKU 6 JϕKU only
means the global entailment and not the local one. Take, e.g.,
Example 15. Expanding Example 14, the presheaf model A of the PR box, (d) of Figure 1, is a
subpresheaf of JT−K described by (3): E.g. A{ai ,b1} = J a1 ⊕ b1 = 0 K{a1,b1} ֌ 2 × 2. Then the global
inconsistency, and strong contextuality Γ ⊢ ⊥ in particular, of the equations Γ in (3) means ⊲⊳A =⋂
ϕ∈ΓJϕKX ⊆ J⊥KX = ∅. Yet Γ is locally consistent, modelled by the PR box.
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This is why, to model the inchworm logic of local inference, we need a presheaf on different
contexts U ∈ C, as opposed to an intersection in a single context V < C, to the left of 6.
Definition 16. Suppose (J−K, F) is an interpretation of a contextual language LC. Then let us say
that a subpresheafA֌ F is a pre-model in (J−K, F) of a formula ϕ ∈ ΦU in a contextU ∈ C, and write
A U ϕ, to mean that AU 6 JϕKU.
Fact 17. If A 6 B for subpresheaves A and B of F, then B U ϕ implies A U ϕ.
Note, however, that this notion of pre-model is context-dependent and concerns formulas in
contexts as opposed to formulas per se. When U ⊆ V ∈ C and ϕ ∈ ΦU, Fact 10 yields
(11) A U ϕ entails A V ϕ, because
∃FU⊆V (AV) 6 AU 6 JϕKU
AV 6 FU⊆V
−1JϕKU = JϕKV
(12) Suppose A is no-signalling. Then A V ϕ entails A U ϕ. This is because
AV 6 JϕKV = FU⊆V
−1JϕKU
AU = ∃FU⊆V (AV) 6 JϕKU
If A is not no-signalling, (12) may fail, and then inchworm inference fails. E.g., in (8), the first step
purports to show that, if A U a1 = b1 and A U a1 = c, then A U b1 = c and so A U∩V b1 = c;
but the “and so” step here requires (12). In this sense, as mentioned in Subsection 2.4, no-signalling
means the context-independent coherence of a presheaf as a model of formulas. Therefore
Definition 18. A pre-model A is called a (no-signalling) model if it is no-signalling. Then we say
that A is a model of a formula ϕ ∈ ΦC, and write A  ϕ, to mean that A is a pre-model of ϕ in any
suitable context, i.e., that AU 6 JϕKU for every U ∈ C such that ϕ ∈ ΦU.
Theorem 19. Let J−K be an interpretation of LC that models a theory ⊢ in L. Then the inchworm logic ⊢C
of ⊢ is sound with respect to the no-signalling models in J−K: If Γ ⊢C ϕ, then A  ϕ for every no-signalling
model A of Γ in J−K.
4.4. The Inchworm andNo-Signalling. Subsection 4.3 primarily concerned how given presheaves
modelled formulas. We showed in particular that no-signalling validated inchworm inference. Let
us discuss, on the other hand, how the description by given formulas yields a model. This shows
the other direction of the connection between no-signalling and the inchworm, from the latter to
the former.
We say a set Γ ⊆ ΦC of formulas of LC is C-finite if ΓU is finite for each U ∈ C.
Definition 20. Let (J−K, F) be an interpretation of LC. Given any C-finite Γ ⊆ ΦC, defineMF(Γ) as a
family (MF(Γ)U =
∧
ϕ∈ΓUJϕKU ֌ FU)U∈C of subobjects of FU.
Fact 21. MF(Γ) is the largest subpresheaf A of F such that A U ΓU for each U ∈ C.
MF(Γ) generally fails to be no-signalling. E.g., A in (e) of Figure 1 isMF(Γ) given by Γ = {ϕ} for
ϕ = (a2 ∧ ¬b1) ∨ (¬a2 ∧ ¬b1); since ϕ cannot be in the context {b1}, Γ{b1} = ∅ and A{b1} = 2. Yet the
description by Γ sometimes manages to give a no-signallingMF(Γ).
Fact 22. Let (J−K, F) be an interpretation of LC that models a theory ⊢ in L. We say Γ ⊆ ΦC is
inchworm-saturated if ΓV ⊢ ϕ implies ΓU ⊢ ∃V\U. ϕ whenever U ⊆ V ∈ C and ϕ ∈ ΦV. Now, if a
C-finite Γ is inchworm-saturated, thenMF(Γ) is no-signalling.
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When Γ is inchworm-saturated, it may not be deductively closed, but the inchworm cannot bring
a new piece of information ψ to a context U from another V, since ψ follows from the information
ΓU that U already has. Fact 22 means that, if Γ is inchworm-saturated and if each ΓU finite and
consistent (and hasMF(Γ)U nonempty or well-supported), then Γ is locally consistent, modelled by
a no-signalling model MF(Γ). E.g., (3) is inchworm-saturated, with each context consistent, so it
gives the PR box, (d) of Figure 1, asMF(Γ).
On the other hand, even when a description Γ is not inchworm-saturated and MF(Γ) fails to
be no-signalling, the inchworm can carve out the “no-signalling interior” of MF(Γ), if Γ can be
saturated in finite (or C-finite) steps.
Theorem 23. Let (J−K, F) be an interpretation of LC that models a theory ⊢ in L. Given Γ ⊆ ΦC, suppose
there is a C-finite and inchworm-saturated ∆ ⊆ ΦC such that Γ ⊆ ∆ and Γ ⊢C ϕ for all ϕ ∈ ∆. ThenMF(∆)
is the largest no-signalling subpresheaf ofMF(Γ).
Take again the example from right after Fact 21: MF(Γ) of Γ = {ϕ} for ϕ = (a2 ∧¬b1)∨ (¬a2 ∧¬b1)
is A in (e) of Figure 1 and fails to be no-signalling. Yet ϕ ⊢ ¬b1, so Γ ⊢C ¬b1, and ∆ = Γ ∪ {¬b1}
is inchworm-saturated, with ¬b1 ∈ ∆{b1}. Hence, by Theorem 23, the inchworm carves out a no-
signallingMF(∆) by removing the red sections from (e). Indeed, in many applications (e.g. all the
examples in Sections 2 and 3), the theory ⊢ satisfies
(13) Given any Γ ⊆ ΦC (that may not be C-finite), for each U ∈ C there is a finite ∆U ⊆ ΓU such
that ∆U ⊢ ϕ for all ϕ ∈ ΓU.
This guarantees the supposition of Theorem 23: Given any C-finite Γ ⊆ ΦC, take its ⊢C-deductive
closure Γ∗ = {ϕ | Γ ⊢C ϕ } as Γ in (13) and obtain ∆U; then ∆ = Γ∪
⋃
U∈C ∆U is such as in Theorem 23.
ThereforeTheorem 23 applies and leads to a family of completeness results organizedby Lemma 24,
which transfers a completeness theorem of a global theory to its inchworm fragment. It yields, e.g.,
Theorem 25, since any (global) regular theory has a “conservativemodel” in a “classifying category”
(e.g. [5, Proposition 6.4]).
Lemma 24. Suppose that a theory ⊢ in L satisfies (13), and that J−K is a conservative model of ⊢, meaning
that, for any Γ ⊆ ΦC,
∧
ψ∈∆JψKU 6 JϕKU for some ∆ ⊆ Γ if but also only if Γ ⊢ ϕ. Then Γ ⊢C ϕ iff A  ϕ for
every no-signalling model A of Γ in J−K.
Theorem 25. Let ⊢ be a regular theory satisfying (13). Then, for any Γ ⊆ ΦC, Γ ⊢C ϕ iff A  ϕ for every
no-signalling model A of Γ in every model J−K of ⊢ in any regular category.
4.5. Completion for Completeness. Generally, the property (13) may fail and the inchworm satu-
ration may not be attained in finite steps.
Example 26. In Figure 1, replace each Ax = 2 with Z, and let Γ be the set of formulas
a1 = b2, b1 = a1, a2 = b1, b2 = a2 + 1, b2 > 0
in the obvious L and ⊢. Then Γ ⊢C a1 > 0, b1 > 0, a2 > 0, b2 > 1, . . . , x > n for every x ∈ X and n ∈N,
whereas Γ 0C ⊥ (although the empty presheaf is the only no-signalling model of Γ). So there cannot
be any such ∆ as in Theorem 23. (Note that the topology of C is essential: E.g., if we take C = PX
instead, then Γ ⊢C ⊥ by Γ ⊢ ⊥.)
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Thus, even if Γ is finite, the set { JϕKU | ϕ ∈ Γ
∗
U } may have no minimum (though it is lower-
bounded by ∃FU⊆X (
∧
ψ∈ΓJψKX) if X is finite); then, in a regular category in general,
∧
ϕ∈Γ∗UJϕKU may
not exist. So, instead of the semilattice SubS(FU) of subobjects, let us use a completion of it, viz.
the semilattice Filt(SubS(FU)) of filters in SubS(FU), and assign a filter of subobjects, instead of a
subobject, to each U ∈ C.
Definition 27. Suppose (J−K, F) is an interpretation of a contextual language LC. Then, by a filter
model in (J−K, F), we mean a presheaf G : Cop → Sets such that
• GU ∈ Filt(SubS(FU)) for every U ∈ C.
• For U ⊆ V ∈ C,
GU = { S֌ FU | FU⊆V
−1(S) ∈ GV } = { ∃FU⊆V (S)֌ FU | S ∈ GV },
so GU⊆V : GV → GU :: S 7→ ∃FU⊆V (S) is a surjection.
We say Gmodels ϕ, and write G  ϕ, to mean that JϕKU ∈ GU whenever ϕ ∈ ΦU.
Then we have the filter versions of Theorem 19, Fact 22, and completeness results organized by
Lemma 24. Observe that every (no-signalling) model A is a “principal” filter model, U 7→ ↑AU =
{ S֌ F | AU 6 S }; so Theorem 28 is stronger than Theorem 19.
Theorem 28. Let J−K be a model of a theory ⊢ in L. Then the inchworm logic ⊢C of ⊢ is sound with respect
to the filter models in J−K: If Γ ⊢C ϕ, then G  ϕ for every filter model G of Γ in J−K.
Fact 29. Let (J−K, F) be a model of a theory ⊢ in L. Given any Γ ⊆ ΦC, the family FMF(Γ) = ({ S֌
FU | JϕKU 6 S for some ϕ ∈ Γ
∗
U })U∈C is a filter model of Γ in (J−K, F). Moreover, for any filter model
G of Γ in (J−K, F), FMF(Γ)U ⊆ GU for each U ∈ C.
Lemma 30. Suppose J−K is a conservative model of a theory ⊢ in L. Then Γ ⊢C ϕ iff G  ϕ for every filter
model G of Γ in J−K.
5. Conclusion
We have formulated contextual models as presheaves valued in regular categories, as well as
providing “inchworm logic” for local inference in those contextual models. We have also proven
“completeness-transfer lemmas” (Lemmas 24 and 30), so that completeness theorems in categorical
logic transfer straightforwardly to inchworm logic.
Let us conclude the paper by discussing connections and applications between the framework
of this paper and other approaches or other fields as future work. First of all, categorical logic has
a long tradition (since [16]) of viewing local truth as a modal operator. Indeed, the logic of local
information in this paper is closely related to the dynamic-logical characterization of contextuality
in [13]. There is also a connection to model theory. For instance, the similarity between inchworm
inference and Craig interpolation should be obvious; indeed, by defining ΦU more generally as a
“language in the vocabulary U”, we can prove a stronger version of Robinson’s joint consistency
theorem (see [6, Subsection 4.1.1]) that is sensitive to the topology of C.
As explained in Section 2, presheaf models, whether no-signalling or not, can model Boolean
valuations. This enables us to transfer and apply techniques fromsatisfiability problems to quantum
contextuality as computational resource. Another connection is to the structure of valuation algebra,
which is used for local computation [14]. In fact, our presheaf models can also be formulated in
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terms of valuation algebras, as a C-indexed family of valuations satisfying certain conditions. We
can expect these connections to help extend local computation to situations in classical computing
where contextual phenomena arise.
The generality of taking presheaves in regular categories is also expected to facilitate applications.
In cohomology, it is typical to use presheaves valued in regular categories, such as presheaves of
abelian groups, R-modules, etc. Therefore the framework of this paper applies to the logic of local
inference within such presheaves. One can also take regular categories of structures that are used
for other purposes such as modelling processes in quantum physics. In addition, the connection to
logical paradoxes [2] is also relevant. As shown in [15, 4], regular categories provide background
for self-referential and other fixpoint paradoxes; so our formalism will unify the two perspectives
on paradoxes.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Fact 1. A presheaf P on a simplicial complex C is a sheaf iff PU =
∏
x∈U Px for all U ∈ C. P is
separated iff it is a subpresheaf of a sheaf, i.e. iff PU ⊆
∏
x∈U Px for all U ∈ C.
Proof. This is just an instance of Fact 8 with S = Sets. 
Fact 2. sPsh(C) ≃ ndSimp/C for any simplicial complex C.
Proof. Let C be a simplicial complex on a set X. Define functors
sPsh(C) ndSimp/C
F
G
as follows. First we define F. Let P be a separated presheaf on C. By Fact 1, PU ⊆
∏
x∈U Px for all
U ∈ C. Then let FP be a map π : A→ X from a simplicial complexA on A such that
• A =
∑
x∈X Px and π is the projection π : A→ X :: (x, a) 7→ x.
• A =
⋃
U∈C PU. That is, for each S ⊆ A, we have S ∈ A iff there is some U ∈ C such that
S ∈ PU, i.e. such that S = { (x, s(x)) | x ∈ U } for some s ∈ PU ⊆
∏
x∈U Px.
Then FP = π : A→ C is clearly a non-degenerate bundle over C.
Let ϑ : P → Q be a natural transformation between separated presheaves P and Q on C; write
FP = π1 : A1 → C and FQ = π2 : A2 → C, with A1 and A2 on the sets A1 =
∑
x∈X Px and
A2 =
∑
x∈XQx. Then let Fϑ : A1 → A2 be the map such that
Fϑ :
∑
x∈X
Px →
∑
x∈X
Qx :: (x, a) 7→ (x, ϑx(a)).
Fϑ is a non-degenerate map of bundles from FP to FQ over C:
• If s ∈ A1, then s ∈ PU ⊆
∏
x∈U Px for some U ∈ C, and so
Fϑ[s] = { (x, ϑx(s(x)) | x ∈ U } = { (x, (ϑU(s))(x) | x ∈ U } = ϑU(s) ∈ A2
by the naturality of ϑ.
PU
Px
QU
Qx
ϑU
ϑx
=
s
s(x)
ϑU(s)
(ϑU(s))(x)ϑx(s(x)) =
• π2 ◦ Fϑ = π1 because π2 ◦ Fϑ(x, a) = π2(x, ϑx(a)) = x = π1(x, a).
• Because π1 is non-degenerate and π2 ◦ Fϑ = π1, Fϑ is non-degenerate as well.
Next we define G. Given a non-degenerate bundle π : A→ C, for each U ∈ C let
(Gπ)U = PU = { s ∈ A | π[s] = U }.
Then Gπ = P : U 7→ PU is a presheaf, with PV⊆U : PU → PV :: s 7→ s ∩ π
−1[V]. Moreover {P{x}⊆U}x∈U
is jointly monic; so Gπ = P is a separated presheaf by Fact 1.
Given a non-degenerate map of bundles f : π1 → π2 between πi : Ai → C (i = 1, 2), let
Gf : Gπ1 → Gπ2 be the family {(Gf )U}U∈C of functions
(Gf )U : (Gπ1)U → (Gπ2)U :: s 7→ f [s],
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which lands in (Gπ2)U because f is a map over C, i.e. π2 ◦ f [s] = π1[s]. To show Gf to be a
natural transformation, fix any s ∈ (Gπ1)U. Then the non-degeneracy of π1, π2, and f , together with
π2 ◦ f = π1, implies that the triangle on the left below commutes and that all the three arrows are
bijections. Therefore the diagram on the right, with h = π2
−1[−] ∩ f [s], commutes as well:
s f [s]
U
f |s
π1|s π2| f [s]
=
P(s) P( f [s])
P(U)
f [−]
f−1[−] ∩ s
π1[−]π1
−1[−] ∩ s π2[−]h
In particular, h = f [π1
−1[−] ∩ s], which means that the square below commutes.
(Gπ1)U
(Gπ1)V
(Gπ2)U
(Gπ2)V
(Gf )U
(Gf )V
=
s
s ∩ π1
−1[V]
f [s]
f [s] ∩ π2
−1[V]f [s ∩ π1
−1[V]] =
Thus Gf is a natural transformation.
It is obvious that G ◦ F  1sPsh(C) and F ◦G  1ndSimp/C naturally. 
Fact 8. An S-valued presheaf P on a simplicial complex C is a sheaf iff PU =
∏
x∈U Px for all U ∈ C.
P is separated iff it is a subpresheaf of a sheaf, i.e. iff each 〈P{x}⊆U〉x∈U : PU →
∏
x∈U Px is monic, i.e.
iff each PU is a relation in S on (Px)x∈U.
Proof. For the sheaf part, suppose P is a sheaf. First,
⋃
i∈∅Ui = ∅ gives an equalizer
P∅ 1 1
1
1
that is an iso; so P∅ = 1. Then for every U ∈ C,
⋃
x∈U{x} = U gives an equalizer
PU
∏
x∈U
Px
∏
y,z∈U
P{y}∩{z}〈P{x}⊆U〉x∈U
〈P{y}∩{z}⊆{y} ◦ py〉y,z∈U
〈P{y}∩{z}⊆{z} ◦ pz〉y,z∈U
but then the parallel arrows are both isos, and therefore the equalizer is an iso, i.e. PU =
∏
x Px. For
the other direction, suppose PU =
∏
x∈U Px for all U ∈ C and fix
⋃
iUi = U. Then the equalizer we
want is
∏
x∈U
Px
∏
i
∏
x∈Ui
Px
∏
j,k
∏
x∈U j∩Uk
Px〈〈px〉x∈Ui〉i
1 = 〈〈px〉x∈U j∩Uk ◦ p j〉 j,k
h = 〈〈px〉x∈U j∩Uk ◦ pk〉 j,k
But it is easy to check that any f such that 1 ◦ f = h ◦ f has the form 〈〈 fx〉x∈Ui〉i, and hence factors
uniquely as 〈〈px〉x∈Ui〉i ◦ 〈 fx〉x∈U. Therefore 〈〈px〉x∈Ui〉i is an equalizer as desired.
For the presheaf part, fix P and number the conditions as follows:
(i) P is separated, i.e. 〈PUi⊆U〉i : PU →
∏
i PUi is monic whenever
⋃
iUi = U.
(ii) P is a subpresheaf of a sheaf.
(iii) Each 〈P{x}⊆U〉x∈U : PU →
∏
x∈U Px is monic.
(iv) Each PU is a relation in S on (Px)x∈U.
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(iv) is defined by (iii). (i) implies (iii) as an instance. (iii) implies (ii), since U 7→
∏
x∈U Px is a sheaf
by the sheaf part above. So suppose (ii), that m : P ֌ F for some sheaf F. This means that the
following square commutes, in which 〈FUi⊆U〉i is an equalizer and so monic.
PU
FU
∏
i
PUi
∏
i
FUi
mU 〈mUi〉i
〈PUi⊆U〉i
〈FUi⊆U〉i
=
Therefore 〈PUi⊆U〉i is monic, too. Thus (i). 
Fact 10. Let F be a sheaf on a simplicial complex C. Then a family (iU : AU ֌ FU)U∈C of subobjects
forms a subpresheaf of F, and hence a separated presheaf, iff AV 6 FU⊆V
−1(AU), or equivalently
∃FU⊆V (AV) 6 AU, whenever U ⊆ V ∈ C. Moreover, a separated presheaf i : A֌ F is no-signalling iff
∃FU⊆V (AV) = AU whenever U ⊆ V ∈ C.
Proof. Fix U ⊆ V ∈ C and write f = FU⊆V. Then, in the following diagram, the longer dotted arrow
making the outer square commute, i.e. AU⊆V, exists iff the shorter one exists, i.e. iff AV 6 f
−1(AU).
Hence the first “iff” in the fact.
f−1(AU)
AV
AU
FV FU
f
iU
AU⊆V
iV
=
=
For the second “iff”, factorize AU⊆V into a regular epi e followed by a mono m as follows; it gives
∃ f (AV) because (iU ◦m) ◦ e is a regular epi-mono factorization of f ◦ iV .
AV ∃ f (AV) AU
FV FU
e m
f
iV iU=
=
Then, because a regular epi-mono factorization is unique, AU⊆V = m ◦ e is a regular epi iff m is an
iso. 
Fact 11. (Assume that X is finite or that S is complete.) Given any S-valued separated presheaf A,
let F be a sheaf such that i : A֌ F and, using AU as predicates in the internal language of S, define
⊲⊳A = J x¯ : FX |
∧
U∈C
AU(FU⊆Xx¯) K =
∧
U∈C
FU⊆X
−1(AU)֌ FX.
Then ⊲⊳A is the limit of A as a diagram in S.
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Proof. Recall that the sheaf F extends to PX. So, for every U ∈ C, write pU = FU⊆X : FX → FU, and
define an arrow ρU : ⊲⊳A→ AU as the composition of the two top arrows in the following.
pU
−1(AU)⊲⊳A AU
FX FUpU
=
Then ⊲⊳A is a cone of the diagram A because, for every U ⊆ V ∈ C, we have AU⊆V ◦ ρV = ρU by
chasing the following commutative diagram, where f = FU⊆V.
⊲⊳A pV
−1(AV)
pU
−1(AU)
FX
AV
f−1(AV)
FV
AU
FU
Nowwe claim that ⊲⊳A is the terminal among the cones of A. Fix any cone C of Awith 1U : C → AU
for all U ∈ C. Then, by Fact 8, for every U ⊆ X we have 〈ix ◦ 1x〉x∈U : C → FU. Therefore, for every
U ∈ C, the outer square below commutes and hence the arrow making the triangles commute, uU,
exists uniquely:
pU
−1(AU)
C
AU
FX FUpU
iU
1U
〈ix ◦ 1x〉x∈X
uU =
=
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Then the definition ⊲⊳A =
∧
U∈C pU
−1(AU) means that there is a unique v : C → ⊲⊳A that makes the
following diagram commute for each U ⊆ V ∈ C.
⊲⊳A pV
−1(AV)
pU
−1(AU)
FX
AV
f−1(AV)
FV
AU
FU
C
v uV
uU 1V
1U

Fact 17. If A 6 B for subpresheaves A and B of F, then B U ϕ implies A U ϕ.
Proof. Immediate by Definition 16 of U. 
Theorem 19. Let J−K be an interpretation of LC that models a theory ⊢ in L. Then the inchworm logic ⊢C
of ⊢ is sound with respect to the no-signalling models in J−K: If Γ ⊢C ϕ, then A  ϕ for every no-signalling
model A of Γ in J−K.
Proof. Immediate from Theorem 28, since every model is a filter model. 
Fact 21. MF(Γ) is the largest subpresheaf A of F such that A U ΓU for each U ∈ C.
Proof. Let U ⊆ V ∈ C. Then, because ΓU ⊆ ΓV, because JϕKV = FU⊆V
−1JϕKU for each ϕ ∈ ΦU ⊆ ΦV,
and because the right adjoint FU⊆V
−1 preserves meets, we have
MF(Γ)V =
∧
ϕ∈ΓV
JϕKV 6
∧
ϕ∈ΓU
JϕKV =
∧
ϕ∈ΓU
FU⊆V
−1JϕKU
= FU⊆V
−1(
∧
ϕ∈ΓU
JϕKU) = FU⊆V
−1(MF(Γ)U).
ThusMF(Γ) is a subpresheaf of F by Fact 10, and ϕ ∈ ΓU impliesMF(Γ)U =
∧
ψ∈ΓUJψKU 6 JϕKU, i.e.
MF(Γ) U ϕ. Now, let A be a subpresheaf of F such that A U ΓU for every U ∈ C. Then, for every
U ∈ C it has AU 6
∧
ϕ∈ΓUJϕKU =MF(Γ)U. Thus A 6MF(Γ). 
Fact 22. Let (J−K, F) be an interpretation of LC that models a theory ⊢ in L. We say Γ ⊆ ΦC is
inchworm-saturated if ΓV ⊢ ϕ implies ΓU ⊢ ∃V\U. ϕ whenever U ⊆ V ∈ C and ϕ ∈ ΦV. Now, if a
C-finite Γ is inchworm-saturated, thenMF(Γ) is no-signalling.
Proof. Fix anyU ⊆ V ∈ C. Then the inchworm saturation of C-finite Γ implies that, since ΓV ⊢
∧
ΓV ,
we have ΓU ⊢ ∃V\U.
∧
ΓV. Therefore a model J−K of ⊢ has
MF(Γ)U =
∧
ϕ∈ΓU
JϕKU 6 J∃V\U.
∧
ΓVKU = ∃FU⊆V (MF(Γ)V).
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ThusMF(Γ) is no-signalling by Fact 10. 
Theorem 23. Let (J−K, F) be an interpretation of LC that models a theory ⊢ in L. Given Γ ⊆ ΦC, suppose
there is a C-finite and inchworm-saturated ∆ ⊆ ΦC such that Γ ⊆ ∆ and Γ ⊢C ϕ for all ϕ ∈ ∆. ThenMF(∆)
is the largest no-signalling subpresheaf ofMF(Γ).
Proof. MF(∆) is no-signalling by Fact 22. Hence Fact 21 implies MF(∆)  Γ ⊆ ∆ and hence that
MF(∆) is a subpresheaf ofMF(Γ). Now fix any no-signalling subpresheaf A ofMF(Γ). Then A  Γ
by Facts 17 and 21. This implies A  ∆ by soundness (Theorem 19), since Γ ⊢C ϕ for all ϕ ∈ ∆.
Therefore A 6MF(∆) by Fact 21. 
Lemma 24. Suppose that a theory ⊢ in L satisfies (13), and that J−K is a conservative model of ⊢, meaning
that, for any Γ ⊆ ΦC,
∧
ψ∈∆JψKU 6 JϕKU for some ∆ ⊆ Γ if but also only if Γ ⊢ ϕ. Then Γ ⊢C ϕ iff A  ϕ for
every no-signalling model A of Γ in J−K.
Proof. The“only if”part is soundness (Theorem 19). So, for the “if”part, supposeA  ϕ for everyno-
signalling model A of Γ in J−K. By (13), Theorem 23 applies and yieldsMF(∆), which models Γ ⊆ ∆.
Hence FMF(∆)  ϕ. This means that, for U ∈ C such that ϕ ∈ ΦU,
∧
ψ∈∆U
JψKU = FMF(∆)U 6 JϕKU.
Therefore ∆U ⊢ ϕ by the conservativity of J−K and so ∆U ⊢C ϕ. Then, since Γ ⊢C ψ for all ψ ∈ ∆U,
we have Γ ⊢C ϕ. 
Theorem 25. Let ⊢ be a regular theory satisfying (13). Then, for any Γ ⊆ ΦC, Γ ⊢C ϕ iff A  ϕ for every
no-signalling model A of Γ in every model J−K of ⊢ in any regular category.
Proof. The “only if” part is soundness (Theorem 19). The “if” part is by Lemma 24, since ⊢ has a
conservative model in some regular category (e.g. [5, Proposition 6.4]). 
Theorem 28. Let J−K be a model of a theory ⊢ in L. Then the inchworm logic ⊢C of ⊢ is sound with respect
to the filter models in J−K: If Γ ⊢C ϕ, then G  ϕ for every filter model G of Γ in J−K.
Proof. Assume the antecedent of (9), that there is U ∈ C such that ϕ ∈ ΦU and ΓU ⊢ ϕ. Fix any filter
model G of Γ in (J−K, F). Then JψKU ∈ GU for all ψ ∈ ΓU, which implies
∧
ψ∈ΓUJψKU ∈ GU because GU
is a filter. Yet ΓU ⊢ ϕ means
∧
ψ∈ΓU
JψKU 6 JϕKU. Therefore JϕKU ∈ GU since GU is closed upward.
Thus G  ϕ.
Suppose that G  ϕ for every filter model G of Γ in (J−K, F), and that G  ψ for every filter model
G of ∆ in (J−K, F). Then every filter model G of Γ ∪ ∆ in (J−K, F) has G  ϕ and so G  ψ. Therefore,
the induction with (9) and (10) shows the theorem. 
Fact 29. Let (J−K, F) be a model of a theory ⊢ in L. Given any Γ ⊆ ΦC, the family FMF(Γ) = ({ S֌
FU | JϕKU 6 S for some ϕ ∈ Γ
∗
U })U∈C is a filter model of Γ in (J−K, F). Moreover, for any filter model
G of Γ in (J−K, F), FMF(Γ)U ⊆ GU for each U ∈ C.
Proof. Fix U ∈ C. FMF(Γ)U is upward closed by definition. ⊤ ∈ FMF(Γ)U since Γ ⊢C ⊤. Now
suppose S, S′ ∈ FMF(Γ)U, i.e. JϕKU 6 S and JψKU 6 S
′ for some ϕ,ψ ∈ Γ∗U. Then Jϕ ∧ ψKU 6 S ∧ S
′,
where ϕ ∧ ψ ∈ Γ∗U; so S ∧ S
′ ∈ FMF(Γ)U. Thus FMF(Γ)U is a filter.
Fixing U ⊆ V ∈ C, we claim FMF(Γ)U = { S ֌ FU | FU⊆V
−1(S) ∈ FMF(Γ)V }. Suppose S ∈
FMF(Γ)U, i.e. JϕKU 6 S for some ϕ ∈ Γ
∗
U. Then JϕKV = FU⊆V
−1JϕKU 6 FU⊆V
−1(S) for ϕ ∈ Γ∗U ⊆ Γ
∗
V.
Thus FU⊆V
−1(S) ∈ FMF(Γ)V. On the other hand, suppose FU⊆V
−1(S) ∈ FMF(Γ)V, i.e. JψKV 6 FU⊆V
−1(S)
for some ψ ∈ Γ∗V. This implies by ∃FU⊆V ⊣ FU⊆V
−1 that J∃V\U. ψKU 6 S for ∃V\U. ψ ∈ Γ
∗
U, i.e.
S ∈ FMF(Γ)U. 
20
Lemma 30. Suppose J−K is a conservative model of a theory ⊢ in L. Then Γ ⊢C ϕ iff G  ϕ for every filter
model G of Γ in J−K.
Proof. Since the “only if” part is soundness (Theorem 28), suppose G  ϕ for every filter model
G of Γ in J−K. Then FMF(Γ)  ϕ in particular. This means that, for U ∈ C such that ϕ ∈ ΦU,
JϕKU ∈ FMF(Γ)U, i.e. JψKU 6 JϕKU for some ψ ∈ Γ
∗
U. Therefore Γ ⊢C ψ and ψ ⊢ ϕ by the
conservativity of J−K. Thus Γ ⊢C ϕ. 
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